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.: Property

PROPERTY
I. EMiNENT DoMAIN
In Karesh v. City Council of City of Charleston' the South
Carolina Supreme Court held on constitutional grounds that the
City of Charleston was prevented from entering into a contract
with a private developer to construct a convention center and
hotel complex. Karesh is the court's first major discussion of a
city's power to use eminent domain for urban renewal since the
1956 opinion in Edens v. City of Columbia2 and is the court's first
interpretation of the new article X of the South Carolina Constitution.
Historically, commercial establishments in Charleston have
been located along the King Street corridor that stretches the
length of the peninsular city. As in many metropolitan areas,
however, some businesses from the central city have branched out
to the suburban areas and others have abandoned the city completely.3 Although residential property in the lower peninsula
has increased dramatically in value during the last thirty years,
commercial property values have decreased in terms of the dollar's purchasing power. 4 In order to revitalize part of the area, a
joint undertaking was arranged between the city and a private
developer to construct a one-block convention center and hotel.
Under the arrangement, the developer was to acquire the
vacant southern section of the block and construct a hotel complex.5 The city proposed to acquire most of the remainder of the
block by purchase or condemnation and to allow the developer to
construct a convention center and parking garage on the property. The structures were to be financed by revenue bonds issued
1. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
2. 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
3. Brief of Appellants at 2; Brief of Respondent at 5, 6.
4. Brief of Respondent at 5.
5. 271 S.C. at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 343. The block is bounded by Hasell, Meeting,
Market and King Streets and the vacant section consists of property formerly occupied
in part by a Belk Department Store. The proposed hotel complex would have commercial
space fronting on Market and King Streets. The area fronting on King additionally would
have contained a department store, restaurant and bar.
6. Id. The city was to utilize a $4.1 million Urban Development Action Grant and
additional funds from general obligation bonds to acquire the property consisting of both
commercial and residential structures, most of which were occupied. The parking garage
and convention center were to include commercial space for lease. Additionally, the city
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by the city and leased by the city to the developer at a rate
7
calculated to pay off the bonds at the end of the forty-year lease.
The undertaking raised questions touching both the power of
the city to condemn the land and the power to issue revenue
bonds under the proposed financing structure. In Karesh, the
court only considered the former question.8 In some jurisdictions
use of eminent domain for these and similar purposes would be
within a municipality's authority? Traditional urban renewal,
including resale of condemned land to private developers, has
been generally upheld in other jurisdictions by applying a liberal
standard to determine whether the land is for "public use."'' 0 The
South Carolina courts, however, have maintained a strongly protective attitude toward property rights and adhered to a strict
interpretation of the public use requirement." The leading South
planned to preserve as many valuable architectural facades on Market Street as possible.
Id. 247 S.E.2d at 343-44.
7. Id. All expenses relating to operation, maintenance and insurance of the parking
garage and convention center as well as all payments on the revenue bonds by way of
principal or interest were to have been payable by the developer as rent. Construction bids
on the entire project and the bond offering were to have been privately handled by the
developer.
The lease was to have contained a warranty that the parking garage and the convention center would be made available on reasonable demand to all members of the general
public and to have provided that no more than ten percent of the space in the parking
garage could at any one time be reserved for the exclusive use of the employees and
patrons of the convention center. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 345. The lease was also to
provide that no use of the convention center or proceeds of the revenue bonds would be
made that would cause the bonds to bear interest that would be taxable to the recipient
or would cause the convention center and parking garage site to become subject to ad
valorem and property taxes within the state of South Carolina. Record at 531.
8. 271 S.C. at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 344. The financial structure arranged between the
city and the developer was alleged not to comply with the Revenue Bond Act for Utilities,
S.C. CoD. ANN. §§ 6-21-10 to -570. The city in its brief relied upon Doyle v. Rosen, 229
S.C. 67, 91 S.E.2d 887 (1956), for the proposition that the statutory scheme did not have
to be followed literally. Brief of Respondent at 42.
9. E.g., City of Phoenix v. Phoenix Civic Auditorium & Convention Center Ass'n, 99
Ariz. 270, 408 P.2d 818 (1965). One treatise states that "[a]n auditorium and convention
center constitutes a public use for which a municipality can exercise the power of eminent
domain." 2A J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DoMAIN § 7.5181 (Rev. 3d ed. 1976) (citation omitted). Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 250 N.E.2d 547 (1969) ("large
multipurpose stadium" may justify use of power); Opinion of the Justices, 231 A.2d 431
(Me. 1967) (municipal parking garage is a "public use").
10. 271 S.C. at 342, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
11. Id. The requirement that the taking of private property be for a "public use" is
contained in S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13: "Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
private property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor
for public use without just compensation being first made therefore." For a thorough
discussion of the development and current status of the power of eminent domain, see
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Carolina case is Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co." which
established that a showing of benefit to the public by a project
was not sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement; rather,
actual use of the development by the public must be shown.
In determining whether the proposed use of the land to be
condemned met the public use test, the court considered three
factors: the relationship of the private developer with the city's
project, the proposed commercial leases in the development to
persons other than the existing land owners, and the adequacy
of the guarantees that the public would enjoy the use of the
facility. The court did not identify any one factor as controlling,
preferring to retain a flexible approach toward determination of
public use.'3 Consideration of these factors did lead the court to
conclude that the proposed undertaking failed constitutionally
because it envisioned a use of the power of eminent domain that
would be in direct conflict with the individual's right to own and
use property as he pleases."
The court in Karesh specifically addressed the trial judge's
reliance on paragraph 10, section 14 of the new article X of the
South Carolina Constitution.'5 The trial court concluded that
since paragraph 10 recognizes "redevelopment" as a proper corporate purpose, the redevelopment at issue constituted a public
Note, Components of Eminent Domain:An Ancient Tool for Contemporary Use, 15 S.C.L.
REV. 943 (1963).
12. 71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485 (1905). The court in Riley cited with approval a thencontemporary commentator who noted that "'[the public use implies possession, occupation, and the enjoyment of the land by the public at large or by public agencies; and
the due protection of the rights of private property will preclude the government from
seizing it in the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague grounds of
public benefit to spring from a more profitable use to which the latter will devote it.'"
Id. at 485-86, 51 S.E. at 496.
13. 271 S.C. at 343-44, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
14. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
15. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 14, para. 10 (as amended 1976, 1977) provides:
Indebtedness payable solely from a revenue-producing project or from a
special source, which source does not involve revenues from any tax or license,
may be issued upon such terms and conditions as the General Assembly may
prescribe by general law; provided, that the General Assembly may authorize
by general law that indebtedness for the purpose of redevelopment within incorporated municipalities may be incurred, and that the debt service of such indebtedness be provided from the added increments of tax revenues to result
from any such project. Any and all indebtedness incurred pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall contain a statement on the face thereof specifying
the sources from which payment is to be made and shall state that the full faith,
credit and taxing powers are not pledged therefor.
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use of property.'" The supreme court found, contrary to the trial
judge, that article X did not support the city's position. The
supreme court noted the absence of any mention in the new article X of condemnation, eminent domain, or the taking of property. Article X, in the court's opinion, "[w]hile ...
authori[zing] municipalities to incur indebtedness for the purpose of redevelopment . . . does not repeal the . . . constitutional provision on eminent domain contained in Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution."' 7 In addition, the supreme court
considered the "redevelopment" provision of article X in light of
section 5-7-50 of the South Carolina Code which limits the power
of eminent domain in redevelopment work to areas that are
"predominantly slum or blighted." In view of the lower court's
determination that the city block in question was not a slum or
blighted area, 8 the supreme court found further justification for
limiting the power of eminent domain in Karesh.
II.

LIMITATION ON ACTIONS FOR

TAX DEEDS

In Scott v. Boyle, 9 an action to set aside a tax deed, the court
held that the two-year limitation on the recovery of land sold at
tax sales"0 was not a bar because the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that the purchasers were in possession of the
property in excess of two years. The Scotts' property had been
sold for delinquent taxes on January 4, 1971; the chief of police
subsequently deeded the property to the purchaser, Red Oak
Lands, Inc., on January 14, 1972. The procedure followed by the
chief of police was defective in that the chief had not levied on,
seized, or gone into possession of the property as required by
statute.2 In 1974 Red Oak placed a "For Sale" sign on the prem16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Record at 530, 537-38.
271 S.C. at 345, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
Record at 537.
271 S.C. 252, 246 S.E.2d 887 (1978).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-570 (1976). The section provides:
In all cases of sale the sheriff's deed of conveyance, whether executed to a
private person, a corporation or a forfeited land commission, shall be held and
taken as prima facie evidence of a good title in the holder and that all proceedings have been regular and all requirements of the law duly complied with. No
action for the recovery of land sold by the sheriff under the provisions of this
chapter or for the recovery of the possession thereof shall be maintained unless
brought within two years from the date of such sale.

Id.
21. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-460(1) (1976), which provides:
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ises and subsequently transferred the property to respondent
Boyle who thereafter was totally inactive with respect to the property. 22 The only physical contact that Red Oak had with the property was the placing of the "For Sale" sign on the property in
1974. 23 On January 24, 1977, the action was commenced by Scott
to set aside the tax deed.?A
Since the rights of a claimant under a tax deed arise solely
by the statute, the former owner may void the deed by proving a
failure to comply with the act. To avoid the resulting uncertainty,
most states have limited the right of the former owner of the land
to a short period within which to test the validity of the tax title. 2Under these statutes of limitation the majority of jurisdictions
requires possession by the purchaser of the tax deed similar in
nature to the possession required under statutes of limitation
2
covering land held in adverse possession.

South Carolina courts have consistently held that the twoyear statute of limitations does not commence until the purchaser
is placed in possession of the property,-7 although the statute
itself contains no such requirement. The rationale of this construction was explained in Gardner v. Reedy:2
The statute did not intend to bar the taxpayer's cause of action
until he had two years within which he could bring his action.
Under and by virtue of such warrant or execution the sheriff shall:
(1) Seize and take exclusive possession of so much of the defaulting taxpayer's
estate real, personal or both, as may be necessary to raise the sums of money
named therein"and such charges thereon;
Additionally, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-550 (1976) provides:

Upon failure of a defaulting taxpayer or other person interested to redeem land
sold for taxes under the provisions of § 12-49-460 within twelve months, the
sheriff shall make title to the purchase and put the purchaser in possession of
the property sold and conveyed.
22. 271 S.C. at 253, 246 S.E.2d at 888.
23. Id. at 255, 246 S.E.2d at 889.
24. Record at (a). The burden of proof in Scott ostensibly was placed upon the party
claiming under the tax sale. Arguably, the burden should rest upon the party seeking to
upset the tax sale.
25. H. BLACK, A TREATSE ON ThE LAw OF TAX TrrLEs § 492 (2d ed. 1893).
26. See cases cited in 72 AM. JuR. 2d State and Local Taxation, § 1057 and 85 C.J.S.
Taxation § 984(d)(1).
27. E.g., Leysath v. Leysath, 209 S.C. 342, 40 S.E.2d 233 (1946); Glymph v. Smith,
180 S.C. 382, 185 S.E. 911 (1936); Gardner v. Reedy, 62 S.C. 503, 40 S.E. 947 (1902). See
generally Note, Effect of Disability of Landowner with Respect to the Acquisition of
Adverse Rights by Another by Statutes of Limitations, Presumption of a Grant, and
PrescriptiveRight in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 292, 302 (1958).
28. 62 S.C. 503, 40 S.E. 947 (1902).
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He could not bring his action until there was a person on the
land withholding possession from him. As was said by the court
in Suber v. Chandler, 18 S.C. 532, in order 'to give currency to
the statute, there must be a plaintiff who can sue and a defen29
dant who can be sued.'
The supreme court in Scott reviewed the minimal evidence
of possession in light of the standard of possession contemplated
by South Carolina case law concerning tax sales;3" the evidence
was found insufficient to meet the standard. The court approached the question of possession only after first deciding that
"short statutes of limitation barring actions to recover land sold
for taxes are not construed with that liberality exhibited toward
the general statutes of limitation."3
The facts of Scott reveal that both Red Oak and Boyle were
record owners for more than two years.32 Indeed, in concluding
that the property had not been possessed for the requisite two
years, the court considered not only the activity of Red Oak, the
immediate grantee, but also that of respondent Boyle, the subsequent grantee.n
The supreme court's refusal to find evidence of possession is
understandable. In Red Oak's case, generally, the placement of
a "For Sale" sign on one's premises should be a sufficient indicator of possession in the context of the two-year statute of limitations. Indeed, the placement of a "For Sale" sign quite arguably
would provide sufficient evidence to conclude that one is in adverse possession.3 In light, however, of the lack of evidence presented to establish the length of time the "For Sale" sign remained erected on the premises, the court was justified to conclude that evidence of possession was not sufficient.
It can be reasonably inferred from the court's treatment of
the facts in Scott that the two-year requirement could have been
satisfied by either Red Oak or Boyle; that is, the statute of limita29. Id. at 505, 40 S.E. at 947.
30. Glymph v. Smith, 180 S.C. 382, 185 S.E. 911 (1936); Gardner v. Reedy, 62 S.C.
503, 40 S.E. 947 (1902).
31. 271 S.C. at 256, 246 S.E.2d at 889 (citing 72 AM. JUR. 2d State and Local Taxation
§ 1051, p. 318).
32. 271 S.C. at 253, 246 S.E.2d at 888.
33. Id. at 255-56, 246 S.E.2d at 889.
34. A "For Sale" sign that is sufficiently conspicuous would seem to meet the requirements for adverse possession set out in Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 491, 118 S.E.2d
61, 63 (1961) ("actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive") so long as the
sign is displayed "for the whole statutory period." Id.
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tions could have commenced running with the taking of actual
possession of the property by either of the two record owners.
While admittedly not necessary to the disposition of the case
before it, the court in Scott did not address the question whether
"tacking," by adding the time that the immediate grantee and
the subsequent owner are in actual possession, would satisfy the
two-year statute. The unanswered question is an important one.
Often, it may not be possible to determine that previous grantors
have been in actual possession for more than two years. Nothing
in the Scott opinion would seem to bar the court from allowing
"tacking" in a future case similar to Scott. In light of the limited
opinion in Scott, however, the record searcher should be on notice
upon discovery of a recorded tax sale that some situations will
cause difficulties in determining whether the two-year possession
requirement is satisfied.
Once it is discovered that property in a chain of title has been
subjected to a tax sale, the record searcher will need to determine
whether the property has been in actual possession for two years.
This determination will obviously involve more than checking
record ownership; the cautious record searcher will find it necessary to secure an affidavit verifying that the possession requirement has been satisfied. The very purpose of the two-year statute
of limitation is to facilitate the clearing of title, 35 and the burden
on all subsequent purchasers to prove two years of possession
appears somewhat anomolous in light of that purpose.
IH.

ZONING

In Estate of Maguire v. City of Charleston3 the supreme
court was presented with an unusual set of facts and rendered a
decision of considerable importance for South Carolina land use
law. The court apparently held that a purchaser of property
zoned for residential use cannot maintain the right to a nonconforming use by asserting the prior owner's incapacity to form an
intent to discontinue that nonconforming use.
In 1963 J.T. Hiott, Jr., a person non compos mentis, 31 inher35. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
36. 271 S.C. 451, 247 S.E.2d 817 (1978).
37. In 1940 Dr. Hiott petitioned the Charleston County Probate Court to act as his
son's guardian and described his son then as follows: "'Josiah T. Hiott, Jr., age twentytwo years since he is a person non compos mentis and has the mentality of a child about
seven years, and is unable to conduct his own business and support and care for himself
.... "' Master's Report, Record at 176.
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ited a life estate in the building that his father, a doctor, had used
as an office. After Dr. Hiott's death, three other physicians rented
the property until 1965. At that time the son moved into the
building, although it was designed exclusively for use as a doctor's office. 3 He resided there until the sale of the property in 1974
to Dr. Maguire. During the period between the death of his father
and the sale of the property, young Hiott was without benefit of
a guardian or committee.
The property was zoned for use as either a residence or doctor's office until 1966 when the ordinance was changed to allow
only residential use. The ordinance, however, provided the right
to continue a nonconforming use until the use was discontinued
or a conforming use was substituted. 9
Dr. Maguire applied to the City of Charleston Board of Adjustment for permission to modify the building and grounds in

order to improve its usefulness as an office based upon the right
to continue the nonconforming use of the property. The request
was denied and Dr. Maguire petitioned the circuit court for certiorari." The petition was referred to a master who recommended
38. The building consisted of a reception room, two examining rooms and a consulting room but had no bath or shower. Young Hiott and his mother, who was also a person
non compos mentis and lived with him during part of the period, "apparently washed out
of the sink and did their cooking in a haphazard fashion." Master's Report, Record at 177.
39. Section 54-10 of the Charleston Code provides in pertinent part:
(1.) The lawful use of land existing at the time of the adoption of this chapter,
or of an amendment thereto, although such use does not conform to the provisions thereof, may be continued; but if such nonconforming use is discontinued,
as evidenced by lack of use for a period of at least one year or by substitution of
a conforming use, any future use of said land shall be in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter.
(4.) Whenever a nonconforming use of a building has been changed to a conforming use, such use shall not thereafter be changed back to a nonconforming
use.
(5.) Whenever a nonconforming use of a building, or a portion thereof, has
been discontinued, as evidenced by the lack of use, or vacancy for a period of
at least one year, or by substituting a conforming use, such nonconforming use
shall not thereafter be re-established and the future use shall be in conformity
with the provisions of this chapter.
CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 54-10 (1975). Similar ordinances to the one interpreted in this
case are CAYCE, S.C., ZONING ORDINANCE § 5-2 (1975); FOREST ACRES, S.C., CODE Appendix
A § 6-1 (1976); GEORGETOWN, S.C., CODE Appendix A, art. 8, § 800 (1964); LANCASTER, S.C.,
CODE § 36-22 (1974); ORANGEBURG, S.C., CODE § 29-21 (1969).

40. Dr. Maguire died in 1974 and his estate was substituted as petitioner. Master's
Report, Record at 175.
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that the city be ordered to issue the requested permit. The circuit
court later set aside the master's report affirming the decision of
the Board of Adjustment and the case was appealed to the supreme court.
The general rule acknowledged by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Conway v. City of Greenville" is that proof of
intent to abandon the right to a nonconforming use is essential
to an "abandonment" of that right.2 To avoid the difficulty of
proving this intent to abandon, some zoning ordinances provide
for termination of nonconforming uses after they have been
"discontinued"; such ordinances, however, are seldom more
effective because "discontinuance" has generally been construed
as being synonymous with "abandonment."43 Therefore, some cities have resorted to "discontinuance-time limitation" acts.
These acts provide for the termination of a nonconforming use
after a specified period of time during which the nonconforming
use has not been exercised." In a North Dakota decision, City of
Minot v. Fisher,45 three different interpretations of the discontinuance-time limitation type of ordinance were identified:
(1) that intent is still required after the expiration of the time
limit; (2) that intent is not relevant under the ordinance; or (3)
that the ordinance raises a presumption of intent upon the expiration of the period.48
In finding in favor of Dr. Maguire's estate, the master apparently determined that the ordinance as applied to the facts of the
case was not of the discontinuance-time limitation type47 and
41. 254 S.C. 96, 173 S.E.2d 648 (1970).
42. Id. at 105, 173 S.E.2d at 652-53. A more general statement of the rule is:
A temporary cessation, even for a lengthy period, caused by circumstances

over which the property owner had no control, is generally held not to constitute
proof of a discontinuance in the sense of abandonment within the meaning of
zoning ordinance provisions since the circumstances themselves negate an infer-

ence of the necessary intention to abandon the use.
3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNNG ch. 61, § 5 (4th ed. Cum. Supp. 1979).
43. 1 R. ANDERSON, AmERcAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.61 (2d ed. 1968 & Cum. Supp. 1975).

The treatise notes that "[tihe courts have merged the terms 'abandon' and 'discontinue'
and require proof of intent to abandon although the ordinance speaks in terms of a use
discontinued for a period of time." Id. at 442 (citation omitted). See also Board of Zoning
Adjustment v. Boykin, 265 Ala. 504, 92 So. 2d 906 (1957), which Professor Anderson refers
to as expressive of the "prevailing view," 1 R. ANDERSON, supra, at 442.
44. 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 42, ch. 61, § 1.
45. 212 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1973).
46. Id. at 839-41.
47. Master's Report, Record at 190. Interestingly, Justice Rhodes, joined by Chief
Justice Lewis, dissenting, maintained that the master had adopted the first interpretation
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noted that the ordinance's one-year requirement applied "only
when the non-conforming use is 'discontinued' by 'lack of use' or
'vacancy for a period of at least one year' .

" The facts in
,,

Maguire persuaded the master that the proscription against nonconforming use should be immediate because the situation fell
under the ordinance provisions, which did not specify a time
limitation."9 Accordingly, the master reasoned that because the
"intent is not 'supplied' by the time period of discontinuance
under the Ordinance, . . . the holding of Conway . . . [was]

mandated."50
Applying the intent requirement of Conway, the master
found two grounds for determining that the necessary intent was
not present.
[Iln the first instance, J.T. Hiott, Jr., had no mental capacity
to form any intent to discontinue or abandon the use ....
Secondly, even if the younger Hiott had been compos, he was
placed, by economic necessity, with the problem of being unable to find a doctor tenant. Thus, his inability to earn a living
coupled with the uncertainty created by the Will contest
created an emergency situation where cessation of the property
usage as a doctor's office was certainly far from voluntary.
Young Hiott's situation (whether viewed from the standpoint
of he [sic] being non compos or compos) fits well within the
numerous cases, such as Conway, supra, which allow for involuntary, unintentional interruptions in property usage."'
In setting aside the master's report, the circuit court concluded that the ordinance was of the discontinuance-time limitation type. Adopting by implication the second interpretation in
Minot, the court distinguished Conway on the ground that the
ordinance in that case contained no stated time limitation after
the discontinuance of nonconforming uses. The circuit court
maintained that the City of Charleston chose "to eliminate the
necessity of any inquiry into intent of an owner of property by
recognized in Minot of the discontinuance-time limitation type. 271 S.C. at 456, 247
S.E.2d at 819 (Rhodes, J. joined by Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
48. Master's Report, Record at 190.
49. "When one 'changes' to, or 'substitutes' a conforming use, §§ 51-10(4) and (5),
the Ordinance's proscription is immediate .... [W]e only deal here with a changed or

substituted use situation. . . ." Master's Report, Record at 190 (emphasis in original).
50. Master's Report, Record at 190.
51. Id. at 194-95 (footnotes omitted).
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inserting a time limit upon the discontinuance of nonconforming
52

uses."

The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit
court order, but did not rely on the circuit court's rationale. The
supreme court briefly noted several reasons for ruling in favor of
the city. Noting that Dr. Maguire purchased tie property with
constructive notice of the amended zoning regulation and notice
of the use of the property, the court saw "no reason to allow the
appellant Estate to take advantage of Hiott's disability."5 3
Justice Rhodes in dissent, joined by Chief Justice Lewis,
urged the adoption of the third construction discussed in
Minot-that is, the creation of a presumption of intent upon the
expiration of the time limitation.5 4 This approach was preferred
by the dissenters because it avoids the due process problem of a
presumption of abandonment even when the cessation of the nonconforming use is due to circumstances beyond the control of the
property owner. Thus, the dissenters reasoned that the mental
incompetency of Hiott rebutted any presumption of intent since
there was no parent or guardian to exercise control over the prop55
erty.
As noted, Maguireapparently holds that a purchaser of property zoned for residential use cannot maintain a claim of right to
a nonconforming use by asserting the prior owner's incapacity to
form an intent to discontinue that nonconforming earlier use.
This holding contradicts the generally accepted principle that the
right to a nonconforming use runs with the land. 6 The effect of a
nonconforming use that does not run with the land would be
particularly significant if the owner of a fee seeks to transfer
property from one tenant who has maintained a nonconforming
use to another tenant. If the right is personal, the transfer would
destroy the right to the nonconforming use. If Maguire alternatively stands for the more general proposition stated in the circuit
court's order that the supreme court affirmed, that is, that the
ordinance avoids the necessity of proving intent, then Maguire
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
& Reed

Record at 204 (Order of Honorable Clarence E. Singletary of July 14, 1977).
271 S.C. at 454, 247 S.E.2d at 819 (Rhodes, J., joined by Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 456, 247 S.E.2d at 819-20 (Rhodes, J., joined by Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
Id., 247 S.E.2d at 820 (Rhodes, J., joined by Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
E.g., Eitnier v. Kreitz Corp., 404 Pa. 406, 412, 172 A.2d 320, 323 (1961); Gibbons
Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 336, 431 P.2d 559, 564 (1967). See

generally 1 R.

ANDERSON,

supra note 43, § 6.37; 6 P.

ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE

CONTROLS § 41.03[6] n.105 (1978).
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provides South Carolina municipalities with a means to avoid the
difficult proof requirements mandated by Conway.
Whichever proposition is ultimately determined to be the
true holding of the case, the court left open the option of negating
Maguire's effect in the future by holding an ordinance similar to
that involved in Maguire violative of constitutional due process.
The due process arguments were addressed by both the master
and the circuit court and argued in briefs submitted to the supreme court. Little doubt exists that zoning regulations may be
so restrictive that they unconstitutionally deprive an owner of
important property rights. The supreme court, however, has left
resolution of this important issue for another day.
EditorialBoard & Staff

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/11

12

